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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
OCTOBER TERM, 1967. 
No. 67. 
JOHN W. TERRY, et al., 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
STATE OF omo, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
In Opposition to a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
To the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
Every state legislative· enactment dealing with the 
regulation of human conduct is a potential cause of in-
convenience and petty indignity. This is the price we 
pay for being free men and for being able to live in an 
orderly, civilized democratic society. That price is 
measured in terms of the restrictions of human conduct as 
enunciated by the laws of the Land and the states. 
Many Amici have passed before the Court in argu-
ment of this matter. Their arguments contain civil rights 
inferences, and problems related thereto, mixed marriages 
and the complications they present. The gist of their argu-
ments is that the right of personal security, the personal 
liberties and the private properties of free men will be 
forfeited if the case at bar is affirmed. 
389 
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The problem presented has no immediate relation to 
any of these arguments. Nor will any of the constitutional 
safeguards pertaining to individual liberty be forfeited by 
an affirmance of the appellate court's decision. 
The formulation of standards of criminal due process 
consistent with the imperatives of individual liberty in an 
orderly civilized society is as much the concern of the State 
and its citizens as a whole as it is of these petitioners, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and the other interested 
Amici. 
With this thought the respondent is interested in 
guideposts in this virtually endless series of vexing legal 
questions as to the rights of the individual and the right 
of our civilized, . orderly democratic society t() continue 
to take necessary steps (in the formulating of rules and 
laws) for the preservation of its existence. 
What the instant case does involve is the right of a 
police officer (society's agent) to make an on-the-street 
stop, interrogate and pat do'wn for weapons (known in 
street vernacular as "stop and frisk.") 
This vexing legal question presents its difficulty not 
in how far the Court should travel along the road but in 
deciding what road should be taken. 
It is in the expectation that the Court, in performing 
its delicate task in the instant case, will balance the 
equities of the individual petitioners in protecting their 
right to privacy against the equities of our civilized, order-
ly democratic society and its need for workable rules to 
use in the repression of ever-increasing crime, that re-
spondent urges affirmance. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
John W. Terry and Richard D. Chilton (the latter now 
deceased), the petitioners, were indicted on a charge 
of carrying concealed weapons, in violation of Section 
2923.01 of the Revised Code of Ohio. The trial court over-
ruled a pretrial motion to suppress evidence (guns) and, 
upon a plea of not guilty, the court, sitting without a jury, 
returned a verdict of guilty as to both Terry and Chilton. 
The relevant facts are as follows: At approximately 
2:30 p.m. on October 31, 1963, a Cleveland detective with 
39 years and 4 months' police experience observed two 
men, later identified as John W. Terry and Richard D. 
Chilton, on the corner of East 14th Street, Huron Road and 
Euclid Avenue (in downtown Cleveland), engaging in be-
havior that immediately attracted his attention and 
aroused his suspicions. Positioning himself across the 
street he observed these men for approximately ten to 
twelve minutes. One man remained at the comer, the 
other walked several hundred feet up the street, peered 
into the window of either a diamond store or an airline 
office and then returned to the corner to converse with the 
other. The other man in turn would leave the corner, 
repeat the same pattern of conduct and return to the cor-
ner. This behavior pattern was repeated at least two to 
five times by each man. During this period, a third man, 
later identified as Carl Katz, approached the corner, spoke 
briefly with the two men, departed and stationed himself 
across the street. The two men resumed their pattern of 
conduct, each making four to six more trips. The two men 
then walked west on Euclid Avenue to 1120 Euclid Ave-
nue where they encountered the third man who had 
spoken with them previously and who was positioned 
there. The detective testified: "* * * I didn't like their 
391 
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actions on Huron Road, and I suspected them of casing a 
job, a stick-up * * *" (R. 42). 
With this belief in mind, the detective approached the 
three men, who then were engaged in conversation, identi-
fied himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. 
Receiving only a mumbled, incoherent response (R. 26-
27-28), the officer took hold of one (later identified as 
Terry), and turned him around in front of the officer fac-
ing the other two. He then patted Terry, the man in front 
of him. At no time did his hands reach into any pockets 
(R. 29-30) . In patting Terry the officer felt the butt of a 
gun in the upper left pocket of the topcoat (R. 29). He 
inserted his hand under the coat and felt the handle of a 
gun. At this point the detective ordered the three men 
from the street to the interior of a nearby store. Retaining 
Terry by the collar of his coat he ordered all three to face 
the wall and place the palms of their hands against the 
wall. The detective then pulled Terry's coat by the collar, 
from the rear, removing th~ coat from Terry's shoulders. 
Exposed in the upper left inside coat pocket was a con-
cealed revolver. The detective removed this gun (R. 185). 
Subsequent examination proved it to be loaded. The of-
ficer proceeded to pat down the second man, Chilton, on 
the outside of his clothing. He then felt an object in the 
left overcoat pocket which felt like a gun. He inserted 
his hand and removed a fully loaded revolver. A similar 
"patting down" of Katz revealed nothing. The three men 
were then taken to the police station where Terry and 
Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. 
5 
ARGUMENT. 
The instant case presents for review an example of 
the principle enunciated by this Court in Ker v . California., 
374 U. S. 23, 34 (1963): 
"The states are not thereby precluded from de-
veloping workable rules governing arrest, searches 
and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effec-
tive criminal investigation and law enforcement' in 
the states, provided that those rules do not violate the 
constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches 
and seizures and the concomitant command that evi-
dence so seized is inadmissible against one who has 
standing to complain. See Jones v. U. S., 362 U. S. 
257 (1960). 
"Such a standard implies no derogation of uni-
formity in applying federal constitutional guarantees 
but is only recognition that conditions and circum-
stances vary just as do investigative and enforcement 
techniques." 
The questions presented in the brief of the petitioners 
assume facts and conclusions which the record does not 
support. The respondent urges that this case presents the 
following propositions: 
1. A police officer has the right to stop a person 
engaged in suspicious behavior, in the absence of 
probable cause for arrest, for the purpose of interroga-
tion. Such action is not violative of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
2. Having stopped such person, based on obser-
vation of unusual behavior but without adequate 
grounds for arrest, the officer has the right to "frisk" 
for weapons for the protection of his own safety. Such 
conduct is a standard set by the State of Ohio. It is 
not violative of the Fourth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
893 
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3. "Stop and frisk" is differentiated from search 
and seizure in that the quantum of facts required to 
establish probable cause to "stop and frisk" is less 
than the quantum of facts required to establish 
probable cause to arrest and search. 
4. In the case at bar the lawful "frisk" produced 
additional evidentiary facts which gave rise to prob-
able cause to arrest petitioners for committing a 
felony in the presence of the officer. 
5. In the case at bar there was a lawful arrest 
without a warrant for the commission of a felony and 
a legal search incident to the arrest; therefore evi-
dence obtained in such search was admissible at the 
trial. 
These contentions will be considered in sequence. 
I. In the stated circumstances a police officer may stop 
and interrogate a person. 
The Court of Appeals in its opinion affirming the con-
viction in the case at bar has adequately framed the first 
question. (State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N. E. 
2d 114.) 
"The ambiguous nature of the word 'arrest,' and 
the issue of the right of the police to stop a person in 
a public street and question him under circumstances 
that would reasonably call for investigation and in-
quiry * * * consequently, the initial question to be 
resolved is the authority of the detective in the cir-
cumstances shown here, to stop and question the de-
fendant. The validity of the subsequent police action 
and the determination of whether the detective had 
adequate grounds to make the arrest will hinge, in 
part, on the propriety of the initial inquiry." 
7 
"The right of the proper authorities to stop and 
question persons in suspicious circumstances has its 
roots in early English practice where it was approved 
by the courts and the common-law commentators. 
See: 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (6th Ed. 1777) 
122, 129; 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (Amer. Ed. 
1847) 89, 96-97; Lawrence v. Hedger (Common Pleas 
1810) 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6. Today, in several 
states, the authority of police officers to detain suspects 
for a reasonable time for questioning is granted by 
statute. E.g., New York Code of Criminal Procedure 
(L. 1964, Chapter 86, Section 180-a); General Laws 
of Rhode Island (1956), Section 12-7-1; New Hamp-
shire Revised Statutes (1955), Chapter 594, Section 
2; 11 Delaware Code (1953), Section 1902; Warner, 
"The Uniform Arrest Act," 28 Virginia Law Review 
(1942) 315; Massachusetts General Laws (1961), 
Chapter 41, Section 98. In others, the right is recog-
nized by court decisions. E.g., People v. Rivera 
(1964), 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 201 
N. E. 2d 32; Gisske v. S_anders (1908), 9 Cal. App. 
13, 98 P . 43; People v. Martin (1956), 46 Cal. 2d 106, 
293 P. 2d 52; People v. Jones (1959), 176 Cal. App. 2d 
265, 1 Cal. R. 210; and People v. Faginkrantz (1961), 
21 Ill. 2d 75, 171 N. E. 2d 5." 
In Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), the Court 
has stated that the states are not precluded from develop-
ing workable rules governing arrest, searches and seizures, 
to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal in-
vestigation and law enforcement," provided that those 
rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant 
command that the evidence so seized is inadmissible 
against one who has standing to complain. 
The development of workable rules governing arrest, 
searches and seizures and stopping a person in a public 
street and questioning him under circumstances that 
395 
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would reasonably call for investigation and inquiry is a 
legitimate exercise of the police power 1 of the State and 
does not contravene any constitutional provisions.2 
Police power is not brought into existence by the 
constitution or by the legislature.8 It is a power inherent 
in the existence of government.4 It is the power of self 
protection and has its origin, purpose and scope in the 
general welfare, or as maintained here, the public safety.6 
The police power is asserted to protect the well-being of 
society and maintain the security of the social order.6 It is 
invoked by the courts to sustain rules and regulations 
passed to provide for the public safety or welfare 7 and 
which do not contravene any constitutional provisions. 8 
The object of the exercise of the police power is the pro-
motion of the public good. 10 0. J . 2nd, Constitutional 
Law, Section 325, page 403. 
The police power is the right of self preservation and 
self protection on the part of the community and its 
1 State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460 (1967), 231 A. 2d 353, 357. 
2 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com., 326 
Ill. 625, 158 N. E. 376, 55 A. L. R. 654. 
3 Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com., 107 Ohio St. 442, 
140 N. E. 87, 30 A. L. R. 429; Colletti v . State, 12 Ohio App. 104, 
31 Ohio C. A. 81, err overr 17 Ohio L._ Rep. 364, 64 W. L. Bull. 
462. 
The police power of the state is not derived from the consti-
tution of the United States, but is a power existing in them as 
sovereign states. Armour & Company v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178, 
67 S. E. 417. 
4 N ebbia v. New York, 291 U. S . 502, 78 L. ed. 940, 54 S. Ct. 
505, 89 A. L. R. 1469; Lakeshore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 
U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 S. Ct. 565. 
s Re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914, 34 A. L. R. 51; Ver-
mO'nt Salvage Corp. v . St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188. 
G State v . Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N. E. 900; Sweet v. 
Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, 16 S. Ct. 43. 
1 Meadowcro~ v. People, 163 ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991; People v . 
Dehn, 190 Mich. 122, 155 N. W. 744. 
s See Note No. 2 supra. 
9 
exercise is justified by the necessity of the occasion. State 
v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 95 N. E. 924. 
The measure of the police power is a measure of the 
public need. 9 It is described as the law of necessity 10 and 
always one of the least !imitable 11 of the powers of gov-
ernment. It is that full final power that is involved in the 
administration of law as a means to the administration of 
practical justice.12 
The term "police power" is not found in the Federal 
constitution or in the Ohio constitution.13 It is a judicial 
invention. Because of its great dimensions and because it 
alters to keep pace with the times, courts wisely have not 
attempted to define it with exactness or precision. H Each 
individual case must stand upon its own footing. To ap-
proach some definition of it in relation to the case before 
9 State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. 2d 204, 90 A. L. R. 805. 
To be a legitimate exercise of the police power, a statute 
must be reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of 
a public good or to prevent the ihfliction of a public harm. Sta:te 
v. Ball.a.nee, 229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731, 7 A. L. R. 2d 407. 
10 Re Yu.n Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835; Randall v. Pa.tck, 
118 Me. 303, 108 A. 97, 8 A. L . R. 65. 
1 1 Qu.eenside HiLl.s Rea.lty Co. v. Sa.:rl, 328 U. S. 80, 90 L. ed. 
1096, 66 S. Ct. 850. 
12 Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43. 
The police power is nothing more or less than the powers of 
government inherent in every Sovereignty to the extent of its 
dominions. A. F. L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 
189 P. 2d 912, Affd. 335 U. S. 538, 93 L. ed. 222, 69 S. Ct. 258, 6 
A. L. R. 2d 481 
13 See note No. 3 supra.. 
14 Colletti v. Sta.te, 12 Ohio App. 104. 
An attempt to define the reach of the police power or to 
trace its outer limits is fruitless; each case must turn on its own 
facts. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L. ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98. 
Definitions of police power which give its boundaries with 
precision have not been attempted by any courts. It is wise that 
it is so, because this, like many of the subject matters of the law, 
is constantly in the process of evolution and development, and 
must be adapted to the social, industrial, and commercial con-
ditions of the times. WesseU v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 
N. E. 43. 
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the bar we consider it as that inherent sovereignty which 
it is the right and duty of the government or its agents 
to exercise whenever public policy in a broad sense de-
mands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to 
guard its safety, order, or to insure in any respect such 
economic conditions as an advancing civilization of a 
highly complex character requires.115 
Considering the increase in crime, and the boldness 
of today's criminal and his use of every modern technical 
device, modern society requires the exercise for the public 
good of the right of officers to stop persons who are en-
gaged in suspicious activity on the streets. 
Certainly the police power is circumscribed by the 
express limitation of the state and federal constitutions.16 
15 West Coast Hotel Co. v . Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 81 L . ed. 
703, 57 S. Ct. 578, 108 A. L. R. 1330. 
16 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 96 
L. ed. 469, 72 S. Ct. 407, reh. den. 343 U.S. 921, 96 L. ed. 1334, 72 
S. Ct. 674. The various exercises by the states of their police 
power stand on an equal footing, all being entitled to the same 
presumption of validity when challenged under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all being of equal 
dignity when measured against the commerce clause. Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520, 3 L. ed. 2d 1003, 79 
S. Ct. 962. 
The states have power to legislate against what are found to 
be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business 
affairs so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific 
federal constitutional provision, or of some valid federal law. 
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 
335 U. S. 525, 93 L. ed. 212, 69 S. Ct. 251, 6 A . L. R. 2d 473. 
While the police power is very broad, it is bound by. con-
stitutional limitations and cannot properly be exercised beyond 
such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of in-
dividuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare. Corneal v. State Plant Board 
(Fla.), 95 So. 2d 1, 70 A. L. R. 2d 845. 
The police power is an attribute of sovereignty and a func-
tion that cannot be surrendered. It exists without express decla-
ration, and the only limitation upon it is that it must reasonably 
tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state, 
and not violate any direct or positive mandate of the constitution. 
Shea v . Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P . 2d 615, 111 A. L. R. 998, 
affd. on reh. 186 Wash. 700, 59 P. 2d 1183, 111 A. L. R. 1011. 
11 
It does, however, include anything which is reasonable, 
necessary and appropriate to secure the peace, order, 
protection, safety, welfare, and best interests of the 
public.17 
There can be no question that the constitutional re-
quirement of due process of law is a limitation upon the 
police power.18 It may be the only real specific limitation 19 
and is certainly the most important for purposes of this 
case if the limits of reasonableness are regarded as 
founded on the requirement of due process. 
A reasonable exercise of the police power does not 
constitute a violation of due process.20 The guarantee of 
due process in the exercise of police power demands only 
that the law shall not be unreasonable, 21 arbitrary or 
capricious,22 and that the means selected shall have a real 
17 See note No. 5 supra. 
18 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 71 L. ed. 303, 
4 7 S. Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016; State v. Crea.mer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 
97 N. E. 602; Mirick v. Gims, 79 Ohio St. 174, 86 N. E. 880; 
Colletti v. State, 12 0. App. 104. 
The police power is not subject to any definite limitations, 
but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safe-
guarding of the public interests. Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. 
Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N. W. 2d 15. 
19 Ba.ton Rouge v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So. 2d 239. 
The test of a police regulation when measured by the due 
process clause of the constitution is reasonableness as distin-
guished from arbitrary or capricious act ion. State ex 'Tel Davis-
Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101. 
The requirement of reasonableness is but a manifestation of 
the due process requirement, see Hoff v. State, 39 Del 134, 197 
A. 75. 
20 See note No. 2 supra. 
21 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v . Wa.lteTs, 294 U. S. 405, 79 
L. ed. 949, 55 S. Ct. 486; Re Steu.be, 91 Ohio St. 135, 110 N. E. 
250. 
22 People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929. 
399 
400 
12 
and substantial relation to the object sought to be 
attained. 23 
Due process of law does not forbid the sovereign to 
legislate to affect a class by description 24 (persons reason-
ably suspected of having committed or about to commit a 
crime) or to embrace the entire population,2G the only re-
quirement being that there shall be some reasonable basis 
and that the law shall operate equally.26 
Government is based upon the proposition that certain 
inherent natural rights of the individual must be sur-
rendered for the common good of all. If this principle 
were not applied, our government and our orderly society 
could not exist. Accordingly, regulations or conduct en-
gaged in by virtue of the police power generally are con-
fined to limitations upon or abrogations of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. Most of the constitutional guarantees 
are subject to the police power of the state and may be 
regulated in the interest of the welfare and safety of the 
people. The state and ~ederal constitutional provisions 
protecting personal liberties do not prohibit such regula-
tions. They merely condition the exercise of the admitted 
power by securing that the end shall be accomplished by 
methods consistent with due process. Personal rights must 
yield in the public interest to the valid exercise of the 
police power of the state. Liberty does not import an 
absolute right to be at all times and in all circumstances 
23 Sandstrom v. California. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d 
401, 189 P. 2d 17, 3 A. L. R. 2d 90, Cert. den. 335 U. S. 814, 93 
L. ed. 369, 69 S. Ct. 31. 
24 State ex rel. Schneider v . Gullatt Cleaning and Laundry, 
32 0. N. P. N. S. 121. 
2:; Aetna F. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 78 S. C. 445, 59 S. E. 148. 
2G Standard OiL Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 73 L. ed. 
856, 49 S. Ct. 430; Davis· v. State, 26 Ohio App. 340, 159 N. E. 
575, affd. 118 Ohio St. 25, 160 N. E. 473, error dismd. 277 U. S. 
571, 72 L. ed. 993, 48 S. Ct. 432. 
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wholly freed from restraint. There are many restraints to 
which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
good. 21 This Court has held that a reasonable abridgement 
of the constitutional guarantees will be sustained under 
the police power.28 
This Court, however, has never squarely decided 
whether the police may constitutionally stop and question 
a suspect without his consent in the absence of adequate 
grounds for arrest. However, the lower federal courts 
permit such field interrogations. See, Henry v. United 
States, 361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959) (Clark, J. dissenting); 
Brinegar v. U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 (1949) (Burton, J. 
concurring); Keiningha.m v. United States, 307 F. (2d) 
632 (D. C. Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U. S. 948 (1963); 
Busby v. United States, 296 F. (2d) 328 (9th Cir. 1961), 
cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962). The cases also indicate 
that an officer may stop and question even though he has 
insufficient grounds to make an arrest. See Ellis vs. United 
States, 264 F. (2d) 372 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den. 359 U. S. 
998 (1959); United States vs. Bonnano, 180 F. Supp. 71, 
78 (S. D. N. Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 
U. S. vs. Buffa.lino, 285 F. (2d) 408 (2d Cir. 1960), cited 
with approval in U. S. vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524, 530 
(2d Cir. l961). 
As stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals: 
"Admittedly there is some division of authority on 
the legality of the right to stop and question; however, 
the better view seems to be that the stopping and 
questioning of suspicious persons is not prohibited by 
the constitution. See, Note, 50 Cornell L. Q. 529, 533 
(1965); United States vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524 (2d 
27 Benjamin v. Colu.mbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N. E. 2d 854, 
Cert. den. 357 U.S. 904, 2 L. ed. 2d 1155, 78 S. Ct. 1147. 
28 See 16 Am. Ju.sp. 2d Const. L. Sec. 287, 307, P. 556, 602. 
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Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 823 (1962). Of great 
persuasive authority do we consider the long line of 
California cases, decided under the rule of People vs. 
Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955), 282 P. 2d 905, in 
which this practice has been upheld. E.g., People vs. 
Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956), 293 P. 2d 52; People 
vs. Simon, 45 Cal. (2d) 645 (1955), 290 P. 2d 531; 
People vs. Jones, 176 Cal. App. (2d) 265 (1959), 1 
Cal. Rep. 210. Also of great persuasive authority is 
the recent New York Court of Appeals decision in 
People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964), 201 N. E. 
2d 32, wherein this practice was also upheld. The 
courts of Ohio do not appear to have been squarely 
presented with this problem before. Therefore, we 
hold, in line with the great weight of authority, that a 
policeman may, under appropriate circumstances such 
as exist in this case, reasonably inquire of a person 
concerning his suspicious on-the-street behavior in 
the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. 
"An individual who acts in a suspicious manner 
invites a preliminary inquiry by the proper authority. 
It does not unreasonably invade the individual's right 
to privacy to hold that the price of indulgence in 
suspicious behavior is a police inquiry. See, Traynor, 
'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States,' 1962 
Duke Law Journal 319 (1962). Such a minor inter-
£ erence with personal liberty would 'touch the right 
of privacy only to serve it well.' Traynor, supra at 
p. 334. If such questioning failed to reveal probable 
cause, it would thereby forestall invalid arrests of 
innocent persons on inadequate cause and the attend-
ant invasion of personal liberty and reputation. If it 
revealed probable cause, it would do no more than 
open the way to a valid arrest. The business of the 
police is not only to solve crimes after they occur, but 
to prevent them from taking place whenever it is 
legally possible. As stated by the New York Court of 
Appeals in the recent case of People vs. Rivera 
(1964), 14 N. Y. 2d 441, at p. 444, 201 N. E. 2d 32: 
15 
'The authority of the police to stop\ <lefendant and 
question him in the circumstances is perfectly clear. 
* * * Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual 
street action is an indispensable police power in the 
orderly government of large urban communities. 
It is a prime function of the city police to be alert 
to things going wrong in the streets; if they were 
denied the right to such summary inquiry, a normal 
power and a necessary duty would be closed off.' 
"Admittedly, this power to inquire may be abused. 
But the possibility of some future infraction should 
not require that the police should now be made power-
less to make reasonable inquiries into suspicious 
behavior. If such abuses arise, we shall deal with 
them when the time comes. However, for the present, 
we hold that under the facts of this case, the detec-
tive's inquiry was reasonable under the conditions 
presented." 
It is well settled that there is nothing ipso facto un-
constitutional in the brief detention of citizens under cir-
cumstances not justifying an arrest, for the purpose of 
limited inquiry in the course of routine police investiga-
tion. Rios v. U. S., 364 U. S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. ed. 
2d 1688 (1960); Busby vs. U. S., 296 Fed. (2d) 328 (9th 
Cir. 1961). 
The local policeman, in addition to having a duty to 
enforce the criminal laws of his jurisdiction, is also in a 
very real sense a guardian of the public peace and he has 
a duty in the course of his work to be alert for suspicious, 
circumstances, and provided that he acts within con-
stitutional limits, to investigate whenever such circum-
stances indicate to him that he should do so. Frye vs. 
U. S. , 315 Fed. 2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1963) . 
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective 
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief in-
formal detention be recognized whenever it appears from 
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the totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers 
could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A 
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis 
from which the courts can determine that detention was 
not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson vs. Porter, 361 Fed. 2d 
412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). 
Reasonable investigatory techniques may be pursued 
by police indoors as well as outdoors and it is not unusual 
for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses 
or to call upon them at their homes for such purposes. 
People vs. Machel, 4.4 Cal. Rpts. 126. Generally, police 
officers may detain and question persons when the circum-
stances are such as would indicate to a reasonable man in 
like position that such course is necessary to proper dis-
charge of duty. People vs. Machel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126. 
II. The right of the officer to "frisk." 
Having stopped such person, based on observation of 
unusual behavior but without adequate grounds for arrest, 
the officer has the right to "frisk" for weapons for the 
protection of his own safety. Such conduct is a standard 
set by the State of Ohio. It is not violative of the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
The petitioners argue that any "frisk" is a search in 
the full meaning of the term. The "frisk" as it evolved in 
the events that actually occurred in this case, and as it 
is generally understood in police usage, is a contact or 
patting of the outer clothing of a person to detect by the 
sense of touch whether a concealed weapon is being car-
ried. 29 The frisk is without question less such an invasion 
20 People v. Rivera., 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 201 N. E. 2d 32, 252 
N. Y. S. 2d 458 (1964), cert. den. 379 U. S. 978. See also Peopl.e 
v. Koelze-r, 222 C. A. 2d 20, 34 Cal. Reptr. 718 (1963). 
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of the person in degree than an initial full search of the 
person would be. It ought to be distinguishable also on 
pragmatic grounds from the degree of constitutional pr<>-
tection that would surround a full-blown search of the 
person. This is exactly the distinction the trial judge made 
in rendering his opinion, affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
and review refused by the Ohio Supreme Court. 
The test to be applied in determining whether the 
frisk is reasonable, as a valid exercise of the police power 
and in keeping with the Ker pronouncement (Ker vs. 
Californ.ia, 374 U. S. 23 (1963)) that the states may de-
velop workable rules to meet the practical demands of 
effective criminal investigation and law enforcement, is 
the same test used in determining the reasonableness of 
a search and seizure: Whether the thing done in sum of 
its form, scope, nature, incidents and effects impresses as· 
being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific 
situation when the immediate end sought is considered 
against the private right affected. State vs. Hagan, 137 
N. W. 2d 895; U. S. vs. Cook {D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1962), 
213 Fed. Supp. 568; Schwimmer vs. U. S. (C. A. 8th Dist. 
1956), 232 Fed. 2d 855, cert. den. 352 U.S. 833, 77 S. Ct. 
48, 1 L. ed. 2d 52. 
Persons found under suspicious circumstances are not 
clothed with a right of privacy which prevents police 
officers from inquiring as to their identity and actions. 
The essential needs of public safety permit police officers 
to use their faculties of observation and to act thereon 
within proper limits (our emphasis) . State vs. H erdma.n, 
130 N. W. 2d 628. 
The right of the police to investigate gives rise to the 
right to conduct a reasonable search for weapons in order 
to protect safety of officers. People vs. Garrett, 47 Cal. 
Rep. 731 (1966). 
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If we recognize the authority of the police to stop an 
individual and inquire concerning unusual street events 
(U.S. vs. Vita, 294 Fed. 2d 524, 530; People vs. Marendi, 
213 N. Y. 600, 609; in a similar direction U.S. vs. Bonanno, 
180 F. Supp. 71, 81, 83, which, although reversed on other 
grounds sub nom., U.S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. 2d 410, was 
cited on this point with approval in Vita at page 530), 
we are required to recognize the hazards involved in this 
kind of public duty. The answer to the question pro-
pounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case 
the exposure to danger and the safety and welfare of the 
officer (the public interest) could be very great. The 
£risk for weapons is a reasonable and constitutionally 
permissible precaution to minimize that danger in the 
interest of safety and welfare. We ought not in deciding 
what is reasonable close our eyes to the actualities of 
street dangers encountered in performing this kind of 
public duty.30 
This question can best be summed up by quoting that 
pertinent part of the Ohio ·court of Appeals opinion re-
garding frisk: 
"Having determined that the police officer could 
validly inquire into the activities of the defendant, 
then it follows that the officer ought to be allowed to 
'frisk,' under some circumstances at least, to insure 
that the suspect does not possess a dangerous weapon 
which would put the safety of the officer in peril. 
30 Police experience amply proves the need to search. For 
exampie, Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842 (1964), records the 
misfortune of an officer who failed to make an adequate search. 
When the officer took his prisoner to a callbox, the man drew a 
gun, shot the officer, and fled. 
Failure to make a proper search is said to be a circum-
stance in 19 percent of the cases in which police officers are 
shot. Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical Evaluation, The J our-
nal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, March 
1963. 
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See, Remington, 'The Law Relating to "On the Street" 
Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected 
Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General,' 51 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police 
Science 386, 391 ( 1960). What is the officer to do in 
this situation? Axe we to allow him the right of 
inquiry and then, when this right is exercised, reward 
him with an assailant's bullet? The practice of 'frisk-
ing' is well accepted in police practice, and police 
officers seem unanimous in stating that 'frisking' is 
done for self-protection and not as a mere evidentiary 
'fishing expedition.' See: 'Philadelphia Police Prac-
tice and the Law of Arrest,' 100 University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review 1182 (1952); Leagre, 'The Fourth 
Amendment and the Law of Arrest,' 54 Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 393 
(1963). The Uniform Arrest Act and the state statutes 
which provide for questioning of suspicious persons 
specifically allow for the 'frisking,' of a suspect. See, 
Warner, 'The Uniform Arrest Act,' 28 Virginia Law 
Review 315 (1942) ; General Laws of Rhode Island, 
Section 12-7-2 (1956) ; New Hampshire Revised Stat-
utes, Chapter 594, Sec. 3 (1955); 11 Delaware Code, 
Sec. 1903 (1953); New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (L. 1964), Chapter 86, Section 180-a. In other 
states the right is recognized by court decision. See, 
People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964); People 
vs. Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956); People vs. 
Simon, 45 Cal. (2d) 645 (1955); People vs. Jones, 
176 Cal. App. (2d) 265 (1959) . 
"In the instant case this offic..;:r of thirty-nine 
years' experience reasonably suspected that the de-
fendant was 'casing' a store with robbery in mind. 
It was also logical for this experienced detective to 
presume that the defendant was armed and danger-
ous. As stated in the record: 
Q. Detective McFadden, can you tell us why 
you turned John Terry around facing the other 
two men, with you behind him? 
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A. Due to my observation, the observation on 
Huron Road of these two men, I felt as though they 
were going to pull a stick-up and they may have a 
gun. 
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that 
the 'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for 
a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a 
search for contraband, evidentiary material, or any-
thing else in the absence of reasonable grounds to ar-
rest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is es-
sential. White vs. United States, 271 F. 2d 829 
(C. C. A. D. C. 1959). Therefore, we hold only that 
on the facts presented in the instant case, the 'frisk' 
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a 
valid inquiry by the police. Each case must be 
decided upon its own facts." 
ill. "Stop and frisk" is differentiated from search and 
seizure in that the quantum of facts required to 
establish probable ca~se to "stop and frisk" is less 
than the quantum of facts required to establish 
probable cause to arrest and search. 
While the constitutional prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures makes no distinction be-
tween informal detention without cause and formal ar-
rest without cause, there is a difference between "that 
cause" which will justify informal detention short of arrest 
and the probable cause standard required to justify that 
kind of custody traditionally denominated an arrest. Wil-
son vs. Porter, 361 Fed. 2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very 
name applies, we deal with probabilities. These are not 
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 
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160, 93 L. ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1002; State v. Mark, 46 N. J. 
262, 271,. 216 A. 2d 377 (1966); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 
460, 231 A. 2d 353 (1967). 
While the rule permitting temporary detention for 
questioning is operative under circumstances short of prob-
able cause to make an arrest, there must exist some 
susp1c1ous or unusual circumstances to authorize even 
this limited invasion of citizens' privacy. People vs. Machel, 
44 Cal. Rpts. 126. 
The rule that circumstances short of probable cause 
to make an arrest may still justify an officer stopping 
pedestrians, motorists, or others on the street, for ques-
tioning does not conflict with the United States Constitu-
tion Fourth Amendment forbidding unreasonable searches 
and seizures, but strikes a balance between a person's im-
munity from police interference and the community in-
terest in law enforcement, and wards off pressure to 
equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable 
cause to arrest, thus protecting the innocent from the risk 
of arrest when no more than reasonable investigation is 
justified. People vs. Michelson, 59 Cal. Rep. 2d 448 
(1963). 
In addition to the pragmatic and factual distinction 
that is made in the case at bar between "stop and frisk" 
and a lawful arrest with subsequent search and seizure, 
these acts are distinguishable from the standpoint of the 
decisions of the courts in the various states on the quan-
tum of probable cause that is necessary as to each. What 
constitutes sufficient probable cause in a stop and frisk 
s!_tuation is no more subject t.o a hard and fast rule than 
is the probable cause for an arrest and subsequent search 
and seizure. It is for the trial court to say in the first 
instance, after hearing the facts, whether there is sufficient 
probable cause. Each case must stand on its own merits. 
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This is precisely what the trial court did in the instant 
case. (State v. Chilton, 95 Ohio Law Abs. 321, 323, 324, 32 
0 . 0. 2d 489.) 
"At the same time a police officer cannot, as far 
as this court is concerned-and will not be permitted 
to-stop and frisk an individual simply because he 
has a suspicion, a mere suspicion, unless there are 
reasonable circumstances justifying a frisk. This 
court believes there is a distinction between stopping 
and frisking and search and seizure. A search is pri-
marily for the purpose of trying to obtain evidence 
in connection with the commission of a crime that 
the police officer may reasonably believe has been 
committed or might be committed. A frisk is strictly 
for the protection of the officer's person and his life." 
The court concluded there was 
"reasonable cause for the officer * * * to approach 
these individuals and pat them. He approached them 
and for his own protection frisked them. He did not 
go into their pockets * * *. But police officers in a 
community also have rights under the constitution 
and rights given to them by virtue of their office, and 
one of those rights as I have indicated is the right 
when the circumstances justify and there is a reason,. 
able suspicion, and for his own personal protection, to 
stop the individual or individuals and not search but 
to frisk, to determine if there are weapons for his 
own personal safety * * * without a warrant." (Our 
emphasis.) 
While the constitutional prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures makes no distinction be-
tween informal detention without cause and formal ar-
rest without cause, there is a difference between that 
cause which will justify informal detention short of ar-
rest and the probable cause required to justify that kind of 
custody traditionally designated an arrest. Wilson vs. 
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Porter, 361 Fed. 2d 412. This Court has held that the 
mere fact that information may be hearsay does not de-
stroy its role in establishing probable cause. Ker vs. 
California, 374 U. S. 23; Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160. 
In Draper vs. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959) the Court held 
that information from a reliable informer corroborated 
by the agent's observation as to the accuracy of the in-
former's description of the accused and of his presence at 
a particular place was sufficient to establish probable 
cause for an arrest without a warrant. 
Generally police officers may detain and question per-
sons when circumstances are such as would indicate to 
reasonable man in a like position that such course is neces-
sary to proper discharge of duty. People vs. Machel, 44 
Cal. Rpts. 126. 
"Reasonable Cause" has been generally defined to be 
such state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care 
and prudence to believe and consciously entertain an 
honest and strong suspicion that person is guilty of crime. 
People v. Machel, supra. 
Question of probable cause to justify defendant's ar-
rest and search must be tested on facts which records 
show were known to officers at time arrest was made. 
People v. Machel, supra. Also People v. Hernandez, 40 
Cal. Repts. 100. 
While Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) does not 
deal with the question of "stop and frisk," the principles 
enunciated therein and approved in Ker vs. California. are 
sufficiently analogous to provide us with answers to the 
present question: 
"Mapp sounded no death knell for our federalism, 
rather it echoed the sentiment of Elkins vs. U. S., 
supra, at 221, that a healthy federalism depends upon 
the avoidance of needless conflict between state and 
federal courts by itself urging that federal-state co-
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operation and the solution of crime under constitu-
tional standard will be promoted, if only by recogni-
tion of their now mutual obligation to respect the same 
fundamental criteria in their approach. 367 U. S. at 
658." (the court's emphasis) 374 U. S. at 31. 
"Second, Mapp did not attempt the impossible task 
of laying down a final formula for the application in 
specific cases of the constitutional prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; it recognized that 
we would be met with recurring questions of the rea-
sonableness of searches, and that, at any rate rea-
sonableness is in the first instance for the trial court 
* * * to determine, id. at 653, thus indicating that 
the usual weight be given to findings of trial courts." 
374 U. S. at 32. 
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective 
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, in-
formal detention be recognized whenever it appears from 
totality of circumstances that the detaining officers could 
have had reasonable grounds for their action, and a 
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, that is, some 
basis from which the court can determine that detention 
was not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson v. Porter, 361 Fed. 
2d 412, 415. 
The trial court's finding of reasonable cause is wholly 
consistent with the foregoing criteria. The court said: 
"There was reasonable cause in this case for the of-
ficer Detective McFadden to approach these indi-
viduals and pat them. He approached them, and for 
his own protection frisked them." (Our emphasis.) 
In the light of that language the trial court was 
doing exactly what this Court had expressed: 
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under standards will be promoted, if only by recog-
nition of their now mutual obligation to respect the 
same fundamental criteria in their approach." 
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Since the precise question had never been decided by 
this Court, the trial court made every effort to follow and 
respect fundamental criteria of due process in determining 
the issue. The only innovation by the trial court was that 
the quantum of evidence to establish probable cause for 
stop and frisk need not be as great as that required for 
arrest, search and seizure. The opinion of the trial court 
abounds with fundamental criteria for deciding this ques-
tion: 
(1) "I am a great believer of the personal rights 
propounded by our Supreme Court reiterated and re-
affirmed, neglected over the years, and given to us 
under the Fourth Amendment, and other amendments 
of the United States Constitution." 
(2) "At the same time a police officer cannot-
as far as this Court is concerned-and will not be 
permitted to stop and frisk an individual simply be-
cause he has a suspicion, a mere suspicion, unless 
there are reasonable circumstances justifying a frisk." 
( 3) "When the circumstances justify and there 
is reasonable suspicion, and for his own personal 
protection * * * frisk to determine if there are 
weapons for his personal safety." 
( 4) "* * * officer * * * assigned in the area 
which he had been placed, and doing the job he-had 
been doing, had reasonable cause to believe and to 
suspect that the defendants were conducting them-
selves suspiciously and some interrogation should be 
made of their action." 
(5) "There was reasonable cause in this case for 
the officer to approach these individuals and pat 
them." 
Not only did the trial court recognize its obligations 
and give respect to the fundamental criteria of due process 
in deciding this question, but it is quite evident that the 
Ohio Court of Appeals, as indicated by the following pas-
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sages, likewise recognized their obligation and gave re-
spect to such fundamental criteria: 
"Therefore, we hold in line with the great weight 
of authority that a policeman may under appropriate 
circumstances, such as exist in this case, reasonably 
inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-the-
street behavior in the absence of reasonable grounds 
to arrest." (Our emphasis.) 
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that 
the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk" 
for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes 
search for contraband, evidentiary material, or any-
thing else in the absence of reasonable grounds to 
arrest. Such a search is controlled by requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is es-
sential. White vs. United States (C. C. A. D. C. 
1959) , 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold only that 
on the facts presented in the instant case, the "frisk" 
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a 
valid inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided 
upon its own facts." 
As to whether there was sufficient evidence which 
gave the officer reasonable grounds to stop, question, and 
frisk petitioners, respondent relies on the state of the 
record: 
(1) Police officer on duty performing his police 
responsibilities. 
(2) Thirty-nine years' experience. 
(3) Observation of suspicious activities of peti-
tioners and other. 
( 4) Concludes a stick-up is imminent. 
(5) Decides to investigate and interrogate. 
(6) Identifies himself as a law officer. 
(7) Asked their names-receives incoherent 
answers. 
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(8) Frisked for weapon for his protection. 
(9) Nature of the suspected crime-stick-up: 
inference of the use of a weapon and violence. 
(10) The absence of assistance to the officer in 
relation to the number of suspects (three) . 
(11) The sex of the subjects- all male. 
(12) The demeanor and seeming agility of the 
suspects and the clothing they wore, as inference of 
possibility of concealed weapons. 
We recognize that the trial court's findings of reason-
ableness, as affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, are re-
spected only insofar as consistent with federal constitu-
tional guarantees and that they are by no means insulated 
against examination by this Court. Spano vs. N. Y ., 360 
U. S. 315, 316 (1959); Thomas vs. Arizona, 356 U. S. 390-
393 (1958) ; Pierre vs. Louisiana., 306 U. S. 354, 358 
(1939) ; Ker vs. California, 374 U. S. 23. 
We welcome the Court's. examination of the facts, in 
making its determinations and findings, to restablish that as 
to reasonableness, the fundamental, i.e. constitutional, 
criteria laid down by this Court have been respected in 
every instance in the case at bar. 
IV. In the case at bar the lawful "frisk" produced addi-
tional evidentiary facts giving rise to probable cause 
to arrest for committing a felony in the presence of 
the officer. 
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioners, while not 
present at the time the officer approached these men to 
question them, nevertheless was present at the time of 
their arrest. There appears to be no question but that the 
trial judge, defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney 
are in agreement that up to the point the "frisk" produced 
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knowledge of the weapon probable cause for arrest did not 
exist. 
The lawfulness of the arrest without a warrant, in 
turn, must be based upon probable cause, that is, where 
the facts and circumstances within his (the officer's) 
knowledge and of which he had reasonable trustworthy in-
formation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 
or is being committed. Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 
quoting from Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925); 
accord People vs. Fisher, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967 
(1957); Bompensiero vs. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 2nd 178, 
281 P. 2nd 250 (1955); Ker vs. California, 374 U. S. 23. 
The information within the knowledge of the officer 
at the time he approached the petitioners clearly furnished 
grounds for his investigation and interrogation. Upon 
identifying himself as a police officer and receiving 
mumbled, incoherent responses, such suspicious evasion 
added further probable c;rnse to the officer's previous con-
clusion that a stick-up was imminent. In view of the 
totality of the circumstances existing at that moment it 
was not unreasonable for the officer to come to that con-
clusion. Thereupon the officer took hold of one man and 
patted him to determine if he had any weapons before 
asking further questions: 
"Q. Det. McFadden, can you tell us why you 
turned John Terry around facing the other two men 
with you behind him? 
A. Due to my observations, the observations on 
Huron Road of these two men, I felt as though they 
were going to pull a stick-up and they may have a 
gun. 
(R. 137) I wanted to se~ if they had any guns." 
Had the officer frisked and found nothing there would 
have been no grounds for an arrest. The officer, while 
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frisking, through his sense of touch felt a bulge in Terry's 
left breast pocket, which he decided was a gun. We must 
at this point recall that here is an officer with 39 years' 
experience and training who has had countless opportuni-
ties to recognize the presence of weapons conc~aled under a 
suspect's clothing. Applying this accumulated experience 
to his observations of these men, the only intelligent con-
clusion that the experienced police officer could make 
was that the petitioners were at that time committing a 
felony in the officer's presence by carrying a concealed 
weapon. To this point there has been no arrest, no search. 
The arrest followed immediately when the men were 
ordered to move inside the store and place their hands 
against the wall. Where before there was no intent to de-
tain, there is now; where before there was no probable 
cause to arrest, there is now. 
The petitioners were not free to go at liberty. They 
were under arrest. Even though technical words "You 
are under arrest" were not spoken, a valid arrest had 
been made. 
Circumstances short of probable cause to make an 
arrest may still justify officers stopping pedestrians or 
motorists on streets for questioning, and as circumstances 
warrant, officer may, in self protection, superficially 
search suspect for concealed weapons and should investi-
gation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, 
officer may arrest suspect and conduct reasonable search 
incidental thereto. People vs. Machel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126. 
To justify the seizure of a weapon which could be 
used against the arresting officer we shall not draw a fine 
line measuring the possible ~ks to the officer's safety. 
The officer should be permitted to take every reason-
able precaution to safeguard his life in the process of 
making the arrest. State vs. Reilly, 402 P. 2d 741 (1965). 
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In State vs. Herdman, 130 N. W. 2d 628, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota uses the following language: 
"In the argument before this court it appears to 
be the claim of the defendant that the evidence used 
against him was the product of an exploratory search 
without probable cause in violation of his rights un-
der the 4th and 14th Amendments. It seems to be 
further urged that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, police officers are not 
permitted to accost a suspicious character on a public 
street for questioning. While the Mapp case and 
numerous decisions recently handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court clearly establish that 
under state Cl~:d federal procedure citizens are en-
titled to uniform protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, we do not understand that 
these decisions have gone so far as to require or sug-
gest that state police officers follow precise procedures 
in making arrests, searches and seizures. The Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual only from 'un-
reasonable' searche~ and seizures; and whether a 
search and seizure is 'unreasonable' must depend 
upon the particular facts of each case. 
"Nor do we feel that the legality of the arrest of 
defendant is tainted because the police officers ac-
costed and interviewed defendant without actual in-
formation that he was carrying stolen property in his 
automobile. Under the circumstances here, the police 
officers did no more than what they were required to 
do in performance of their duties. * * *" 
However convincing cases from other jurisdictions 
may be, this Court in cases under the Fourth Amendment 
has long recognized that the lawfulness of arrest by state 
officers for federal offenses is to be determined by refer-
ences to state law insofar as it is not violative of the fed-
eral constitution. Miller v. U. S., 357 U. S. 301 (1958); 
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U. S. v. DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Johnson v. U. S., 
333 U. S. 10, 15, Note 5 (1948). 
A fortiori, the lawfulness of these arrests by the 
officer for state offenses is to be determined by Ohio law. 
Ohio Revised Code Section 2935.04 provides: 
"2935.04. When Any Person May Arrest. 
"When a felony has been committed, or there is 
reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been 
committed, any person without a warrant may arrest 
another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is 
guilty of the offense, and detain him until a warrant 
can be obtained." 
Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.01 provides in perti-
nent part: 
"2923.01. Carrying of Concealed Weapon. 
"No person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, 
or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his 
person. This section does not affect the right of sher-
iffs, regularly appointed _police officers of municipal 
corporations, regularly elected constables, and special 
officers as provided by Sections 311.07, 737.10, 
1717.06, 1721.14, and 2917.32 of the Revised Code, to 
go armed when on duty. * * *" 
To sum up this question we again refer to our Court 
of Appeals Opinion: 
"As a result of the valid 'frisk,' a fully loaded auto-
matic was discovered concealed on the person of the 
defendant. The unauthorized possession of this weap~ 
on is a felony under Section 2923.01, Revised Code. 
According to the uncontradicted evidence in this case, 
the defendant was not arrested until after he was 
ordered into the store. At the moment of the arrest, 
the detective had reasonable grounds to believe a 
felony was being committed. As stated in Beck vs. 
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964): 
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'Whether an arrest is constitutionally valid depends 
upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, 
the officers had probable cause to make it-
whether at that moment, the facts and circum-
stances within their knowledge of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient 
to warrant a prudent man in believing the petition-
ers had committed or were committing an offense.' 
"Therefore, we hold that, as the detective had 
validly found the gun, he had at the moment of the 
arrest adequate probable cause to arrest the defend-
ant, Busby vs. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1961), 296 
F. 2d 328, and that the arrest in no way violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
"One further point remains to be discussed con-
cerning defendant's contention that the arrest oc-
curred at the time of the initial questioning and there-
fore under the exclusionary rule of Mapp vs. Ohio, 
367 U. S. 643 (1961), the evidence must be sup-
pressed. Although we have held that the arrest in 
this case did not take place until the defendant was 
ordered into the store, we must note in passing that 
even if the arrest took place as defendant contends, it 
does not necessarily follow that this evidence must 
be suppressed. 31 
"The Mapp exclusionary rule was imposed upon 
the states not because of some command inherent in 
the Fourth Amendment, but rather because the Su-
preme Court believed that it was the only way the 
police could be forced to respect the Fourth Amend-
ment. If the police could not obtain a conviction 
using evidence unlawfully obtained, they would have 
no incentive to conduct illegal searches. If we keep in 
31 Some searches made a few moments before the arrest to 
which they were incidental have been upheld and the evidence 
seized admissible. U. S. v. Devenere, 332 F. 2d 160 (1964); U. S. 
v. Boston, 330 F. 2d 937 (1964); Dickey v. U. S ., 332 F. 2d 773 
(1964) . 
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mind this raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule, we 
can guard against confusion in the attendant rules 
that are developed. A judicial rule rendering evi-
dence produced as the result of a 'frisk' inadmissible 
would fail to deter the police from 'frisking' suspects 
believe to be armed as police 'frisk' for their own 
protection rather than for the purpose of looking for 
evidence. A rule of inadmissibility in such cases 
could only result in allowing the armed criminal to go 
free although failing to any meaningful extent to pro-
tect individual liberty. The exclusionary rule of 
illegally obtained evidence cannot be interpreted 
solely to provide a tidy 'fox hunting' theory of crim-
inal justice. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
to control police misconduct and in this context it 
must be applied. Traynor, 'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large 
In the Fifty States,' 1962 Duke Law Journal 319 
(1962); Note, 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 529 (1965). 
"Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court would 
hold that federal officers may not inquire into sus-
picious street activities or 'frisk' in the absence of 
probable cause to airest, this does not necessarily 
invalidate the applicable state rules. There is no 
mandate in the Mapp opinion that the states hence-
forth must abide by all the interpretations of the 
federal courts. Traynor, 'Mapp vs. Ohio at Large In 
the Fifty States,' Duke Law Journal (1962) 319 at 
320. Local problems of law enforcement are quite 
different from federal problems, and the range of 
crimes encompassed by the states' jurisdiction creates 
more complicated patterns to be dealt with. The states 
are not precluded from developing 'workable rules' 
governing arrest, searches and seizures to meet the 
practical demands of effective criminal investigation 
and law enforcement provided those rules do not vio-
late the constitutional proscriptions against unrea-
sonable searches and the concomitant command that 
evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has 
421 
j ., 
l ' 
422 
34 
standing to complain. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 
(1963); Beck vs. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964). The 
necessities of law enforcement in large urban areas 
require the procedures utilized in the instant case. 
We agree with the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals when they stated that they cannot believe that 
the 'Supreme Court has forbidden the police to in-
vestigate crime.' Trilling vs. United States, 260 F. 
(2d) 677, 700 (D. C. Cir. 1958) ." 
It is incorrectly argued by the petitioners that the 
trial court made a finding that the arrest was unlawful 
and that after making such a finding of illegal arrest the 
court should have suppressed the evidence. The fact is 
that the trial court never held that these men were 
illegally arrested in this case. The court merely said that 
had the arrests preceded the frisking of the men, such 
arrests would then have been illegal. The court then de-
lineated the distinction between "frisking" as commonly 
practiced by police officers when they stop a suspect and 
the search of the person incident to arrest. 
If we accept the law of "stop and frisk" as a benefit 
to society in the interest of safety and welfare, the sub-
sequent factual situation must be looked into in the light 
of that law to establish whether we have a legal arrest and 
a search incident thereto. The facts as heretofore dis-
cussed in no way abridge the constitutional rights of the 
petitioners. 
The petitioners contend, however, at certain points 
of their argument that despite a right of inquiry, the arrest 
took place the moment the defendant was questioned by 
the detective. They argue that at that time there were no 
adequate "reasonable grounds" to arrest and therefore 
under the exclusionary rule of Ma.pp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643 (1961), the evidence must be suppressed. In support 
of this the petitioner's brief states: 
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"Since the police officer in this case did not conduct 
any interrogation of the defendant and his com-
panions other than an inquiry of their names * * * 
his purpose was to arrest and not to interrogate." 
A principal cause of the difficulty here is the am-
biguous nature of the word "arrest" to signify the mere 
act of stopping or restraining a person. But the term 
"arrest" is more commonly used in the technical criminal 
law sense as the seizure of an alleged offender to answer 
for a crime. Note, 39 New York University Law Review 
1093, 1096 (1964); Commonwealth vs. Lehan, 347 Mass. 
197 (1964). The cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court appear to have adopted this later usage, see 
Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136 (1925); 
Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 163 (1949), and 
it is the usage that has been adopted by the courts of Ohio. 
In 5 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), Arrest, Sec. 3, p . 19, "ar-
rest" is defined as follows: 
"An arrest as the term is used in criminal law 
signifies the apprehension or detention of the person 
of another in order that he may be forthcoming to 
answer an alleged or supposed crime." 
Similarly, in State vs. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 268 
(1959), the court quoted with approval the following 
definition of arrest: 
"To constitute an 'arrest', four requisites are in-
volved: A purpose to take the person into custody of 
the law, under real or pretended authority and an 
actual or constructive seizure or detention of his per-
son, so understood by the person arrested." 
It is readily apparent that a required element of an 
arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. United States 
vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 at 81-83. In the instant 
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case, when the detective approached the defendant, he 
had, as shown by uncontradicted testimony, no intention 
at all to arrest, but only to inquire as to the defendant's 
activities. As stated in the record: 
"Q. You observed these men for some ten to 
twelve minutes? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You observed the mode of conduct that you 
have described to us? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did you, sir, as a police officer consider that 
you should investigate it? 
A. I did. 
* * * 
Q. * * * after they left the corner and you ob-
served them again in front of * * * (the store where 
the three men met) * * * what did you do? 
A. I stopped them and went over and talked to 
them." 
As to the exact time when the arrest took place, the record 
shows: 
"Q. Then in this situation you considered them 
to be under arrest when you ordered the store people 
to call for the wagon? 
A. That's right." 
It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the case of 
Henry vs. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959) establishes 
the point that the arrest in the instant case took place the 
moment the defendant was stopped by the detective. 
However, in the Henry case, the government conceded in 
the lower courts, see 259 F. (2d) 725 (7th Cir. 1958), and 
adhered to the concession before the Supreme Court, that 
the "arrest" occurred the moment the car in which Henry 
was riding was stopped by the federal agents. The Court 
stated: 
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"The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to that 
conces~ion here, that the arrest took place when the 
federal agents stopped the car. This is our view of 
the facts of this particular case." 361 U. S. at 103. 
When the opinion in Henry is read in light of this 
concession, it is apparent that the Court was only deciding 
that, in the circumstances of that case, there was no prob-
able cause to justify an "arrest" at the time the car in 
which Henry was riding was stopped. See, United States 
vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 at p. 85; Busby vs. United 
States, 296 F. 2d 328. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held in the instant 
case, that the actual arrest did not occur until the defend-
ant was ordered into the store after the loaded gun was 
discov~ed concealed on his person; Cf. Rios vs. United 
Sta.tes, 364 U. S. 253 (1960). 
Section 2935.01 of the Ohio Revised Code defines 
arrest: 
"To deprive a person of his liberty by legal authority. 
The seizing of a person and detaining him in the 
custody of the law." 
V. In the instant case there was a lawful arrest without 
a warrant for the commission of a felony and a legal 
search incident to the arrest; therefore evidence ob-
tained in such search was admissible at the trial. 
Since there was a lawful arrest, the sole point re-
maining concerns the lawfulness of the search and ad-
missibility of the evidence seized. The evidence at issue, 
in order to be admissible, must be the product of a search 
incident to a lawful arrest, since the officer had no search 
warrant. The search most commonly made by law enforce-
ment officers, and the subject of the petitioner's complaint 
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herein, is that of the person of the accused whom the 
officer had arrested. Searches of the person must conform 
to federal constitutional standards. The Fourth Amend-
ment provides in part "* * * that the right of the people 
to be secure in their person, house, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated * * * ." 
The vast majority of searches of the person are made 
incidental to lawful arrest. English and American law 
has always recognized the right on the part of the govern-
ment to search the person of the accused when legally 
arrested. Weeks vs. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914); 
Abel vs. U. S., 362 U. S. 217 (1960). 
The law on this subject has long been so well settled 
that it is useless to do more than state it whenever the 
occasion arises. Lefkowitz vs. U. S . Atty., 52 Fed. 2d 52 
(1931), affirmed 285 U. S. 452. 
The right to search applies to arrests for misde-
meanors as well as to thos~ for felonies, U. S. vs. Schned, 
278 Fed. 650 (1922); Davis vs. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946), 
assuming an arrest in the full sense of the term. 
The legal basis of the right to search is given by law 
to the arresting officer for three reasons: 
(1) To protect the officer against harm; 
(2) to deprive the prisoner of potential means 
of escape; and 
( 3) to prevent destruction of evidence by the 
arrested person. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in U.S . v . Rabinowitz, 
339 U. S. 56 (1950); Abel v. U. S., 362 U. S. 217 at 236. 
If the arrest of the person is unlawful, any subsequent 
search made incidental to arrest is unreasonable. U. S. v. 
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DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Brandon v. U. S., 270 F. 2d 
311 (1959), Note 5, cert. den. 362 U. S. 943; Bynus v. 
U. S., 262 U. S. 465; Williams v . U. S., 237 F. 2d 789 
(1956). 
No matter how valid the arrest may be in a technical 
sense, if the court finds that it was used by the officers 
simply as a pretext to make a search of the person, the 
search is unreasonable. Taglavore v. U. S., 291 F. 2d 262 
(1961) . "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence." U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). 
The search of the person, incidental to arrest, should 
be made by one or more of the arresting officers. U. S. v. 
Grieco, 25 F. R. D. 58 (1960). 
The officer's right to make a search of the person 
incidental to arrest being predicated upon the arrest, the 
search must follow the arrest, not precede it. White v. 
U. S., 271 F. 2d 829 (1959); U. S. v. Hamn, 163 F. Supp. 
4 (1958) . 
At this point the distinction made by the trial court 
and the appellate court comes into focus. The foregoing 
rule in the White and Hamn cases and the decision in the 
Mapp case will not outlaw a state officer's frisking or 
even a search of the person made prior to arrest. Under 
the Uniform Arrest Act, adopted with modifications in 
Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, "a peace 
officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person 
whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided 
in Section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to be-
lieve that he is in danger if the person possesses a danger-
ous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take 
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when 
he shall either return it or arrest the person." "The Uni-
form Arrest Act," 28 Virginia Law Review 315 at 344 
(1942). 
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The law in the case at bar as pronounced in the opin-
ion of the Ohio Court of Appeals is so well founded that, 
in a case involving almost identical facts, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has quoted and cited with approval 
that opinion. State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353. 
(September 1967.) 
The proposition that evidence seized as a result of a 
lawful arrest followed by a legal search of the person is 
so axiomatic that it requires no further argument here. 
CONCLUSION. 
It was stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in "The Common 
Law and Collected Legal Papers": 
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prev-
alent moral and political theories, institutions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prej-
udices which judges share with their fellow men, 
have had a good de~ to do with the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned." 
Recognition must be given to the fact that in our 
changing society conditions and circumstances vary; that 
logic, experience, necessity, prevailing moral and political 
theories, public policy and prejudices all reflect and deter-
mine the rules under which we as men live. But these 
are not the only elements to which recognition must be 
given in formulating such rules. 
The realities of our currently changing society require 
the addition of another ingredient-perhaps the most 
essential one-the deadly realism of crime. We should 
therefore take note of the experiences of those who have 
been confronted with this deadly reality to the end that 
our steps will be toward that road on which the guideposts 
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will be directed to insuring the safety and welfare of the 
personnel to whom our own safety and welfare are 
entrusted. 
While this brief is in preparation, October 12, 1967, 
we are confronted with a classic example of the deadly 
realism of crime. Through the news media we are in-
formed that an automobile containing four men was in-
volved in several holdups. The state highway patrol re-
ceived a description of the automobile. The officers pur-
sued a car matching the description and brought it to a 
halt. A patrohnan dismounted from his car to investigate 
and interrogate the occupants. As he approached their 
automobile he was met with a bullet. Except for the fact 
that an item of his equipment (a belt) deflected the bullet, 
this officer would have been killed. Such experience in-
volving public safety should be far more convincing as to 
the deadly realism of crime than any logic respondent 
could present. Experience and necessity, as illustrated 
by this incident, demonstrate that the right to stop and 
frisk is essential for the welfare of the officer and the pro-
tection of the public. Experience and necessity should of 
themselves dictate affirmance of the judgment in this case. 
Thus we urge that due recognition of safety, experi-
ence, necessity and considerations of public policy and 
the deadly realism of crime merit affi.rmance of this deci-
sion to the end that the maximum safety and security be 
afforded to those to whom are entrusted the protection of 
the well-being of society. To those who have beat the 
drums of fear that the framework of the constitutional 
safeguards will collapse and we will move several steps 
forward to a police state if this case is affirmed, we reply 
in the words of Judge Lewis of the United States Court of 
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Anspach v. U. S., 305 F. 2d 48 
(1962): 
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"But the prevention and detection of crime ·is not a 
polite business and we see no need or justification for 
reading into the fourth amendment a standard of con-
duct for law enforcement officials which would leave 
society at the mercy of those dedicated to the destruc-
tion of the very freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. The 'pursuit of happiness' referred to by Justice 
Brandeis in Olmstead can be destroyed by idealistic 
theory that shuns the deadly realism of crime." 
Even though this case merits affirmance on the basis 
of any one of the elements that determine the law--chang-
ing conditions and circumstances, necessity, moral and 
political theories, public policy, prejudice, the deadly 
realism of crime--in the end the decision rests on the sum 
total of these elements. The affirmance of the law in this 
case is logically and fundamentally fair when equated with 
the deadly realism of crime. In the face of this deadly 
reality, affirmance on the basis of the sum total of these 
elements results in a benefit to society and is not arbitrary 
or capricious. 
"The judicial approach to the problem, of course, 
must be in a spirit of cooperation with the police 
officials in the administration of justice. They are 
directly charged with the responsibility for the main-
tenance of law and order and are under the same 
obligation as the judicial arm to discharge their duties 
in a manner consistent with the Constitution and 
statutes. The prevention and punishment of crime 
is a difficult and dangerous task, for the most part 
performed by security and prosecuting personnel in 
a spirit of public service to the community. Only by 
the maintenance of law and order may the rights of 
the criminal and the law-abiding elements of the 
population be protected." Mr. Justice Reed dissent-
ing in Upshaw v. U. S., 335 U. S. 410 (1948). 
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Thus we conclude our case by urging that if the rules 
that we as men live under are to stand and to meet the 
test of the deadly realism of crime, the decision of the Ohio 
Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN T. CORRIGAN' 
PTosecuting .4.ttorney for 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 
REUBEN M. PAYNE, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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